A decision maker is characterized by two binary relations. The first reflects decisions that are rational in an "objective" sense: the decision maker can convince others that she is right in making them. The second relation models decisions that are rational in a "subjective" sense: the decision maker cannot be convinced that she is wrong in making them.
Introduction
We distinguish between two notions of rational choice. A choice is objectively rational if the decision maker can convince other, presumably reasonable people, that she is right it making it. A choice is subjectively rational if others cannot convince the decision maker that she is wrong in making it.
These definitions can also be applied to an entire binary relation, %, that is, to a set of actual or hypothetical binary choices. A binary relation % is objectively rational if each of its instances is. By contrast, for % to be subjectively rational it does not suffice that each of its instances is subjectively rational; it is also necessary that these preferences, taken together, cannot be shown to be "wrong".
It is useful, though not necessary, to think of "being able to convince of" as "having a proof that". Consider a model (not formalized here) in which preference statements such as f % g or f Â g are basic propositions, used to generate proofs in a given logic. A proof presumably begins with such propositions that are accepted as statistical analysis of objective evidence, as scientific facts, and so forth. For instance, such statements might include the preference for betting on the sun rising tomorrow than on its not rising, or on the earth being round rather than flat. The proof is allowed to use standard logic and mathematical and statistical analysis, as well decision theoretic axioms.
For example, transitivity may be used as an inference rule, allowing one to concatenate a proof that f % g with a proof that g % h to get a proof that f % h.
Using this logic metaphor, it is objectively rational to express a preference f % g if there is a proof, using the logic described above and the appropriate decision theoretic axioms (re-incarnated as inference rules), that f % g. In other words, one may view the objectively rational relation % as consisting of all provable preference statements. By contrast, the relation % is subjectively rational if it leads to no inconsistencies. Hence, objective rationality is essentially a property of a particular instance of a relation, f % g, whereas subjective rationality is a property of the entire relation %.
Our goal in this paper is to ask, which axioms of decision theory under uncertainty are appropriate, from a normative point of view, for objective and for subjective rationality. Specifically, we use the Anscombe-Aumann framework. We briefly discuss three axioms before we turn to the formal analysis. The discussion of the completeness axiom appears to be inherent to the distinction between the two notions of rationality. We then turn to transitivity as an example of an axiom that we find equally compelling for the two notions of rationality. Finally, we discuss the independence axiom, where we argue that the two notions differ.
Completeness
It is the normal state of affairs that objective rationality yields an incomplete relation. Science is silent on many questions, and classical statistics often leaves us with inconclusive results. By contrast, the standard normative justification of completeness applies to subjective rationality: choices have to be made.
Dealing with an incomplete relation is tantamount to sweeping certain choices under the rug. It is typically considered more responsible to bring these choices forth, and to have a complete relation, however arbitrary and incoherent it may be. For that reason we will require that a subjectively rational relation % be complete.
Transitivity
We will require both the objective and the subjective rational relations to be transitive. However, this axiom is interpreted differently in the two cases.
Regarding objective rationality, transitivity is a basic "inference rule", as explained above: it allows one to take a proof that f % g and a proof that g % h, and generated a new proof that f % h. When subjective rationality is discussed, we have to concede that some of the preferences f % g cannot be backed by such a proof. Hence transitivity cannot be used as an inference rule, concatenating proof: there may not be any proofs to concatenate. Still, a violation of transitivity is embarrassing. A decision maker expressing strict preferences f Â g Â h Â f can be convinced that her preferences are "irrational", or "wrong". Importantly, in order to make this argument, one need not point out that any of the pairs, f Â g, g Â h, or h Â f is wrong. It suffices to show that the three relation instances, taken together, do not make sense.
Thus, we will assume transitivity as a requirement on subjective rationality, not because it can be used positively, to show what is right, but because it can be used negatively, to show that something is wrong.
Independence
As an example in which objective and subjective rationality may differ, we propose Anscombe-Aumann's independence axiom, namely that f % g if and only if αf + (1 − α)h % αg + (1 − α)h (for all α ∈ (0, 1) and every three acts f, g, h). Consider first objective rationality. Suppose that f % g. That is, there exists a proof, starting with objectively acceptable preferences, that f is at least as good as g. A decision theorists comes along and argues, based on the standard logic of the axiom, that αf + (1 − α)h should be at least as good as αg + (1 − α)h. The argument appears acceptable: the proof that f % g, concatenated with the independence inference rule, yields the conclusion
Next suppose that subjective rationality is concerned. In this case, the relation f % g need not reflect a good reason to prefer f to g, and it may follow from more arbitrary considerations, or from lack of information. For example, assume that there are two states of the world, and that f = (1, 0) and g = (0, 1). The decision maker has no information about the probability of the two states, and therefore her objective rationality relation does not rank them. Having to make a decision, the decision maker might shrug her shoulders and decide that they are equivalent, namely, that f ∼ g, due to symmetry.
Next consider the mixing of f and g with h = f . For α = 0.5, the mixture αg+(1−α)h completely hedges against uncertainty, leaving the decision maker with a risky act. The mixture of f with h = f clearly leaves the decision maker with f , without any reduction of uncertainty. The decision maker might plausibly argue that αf + (1 − α)h is not equivalent to αg + (1 − α)h. Indeed, the former is uncertain whereas the latter -only risky. Importantly, when the decision maker proclaimed that f and g were equivalent, she did not know they were; she only subscribed to a default decision. Contradicting the implication of such an arbitrary decision, coupled with the independence axiom is arguably not as embarrassing as, say, exhibiting cyclical preferences.
The present model
In this paper we assume that the decision maker has a well-defined utility function. Our focus is on situations where probabilities are neither given, nor can they be easily deduced or estimated. The works of Ramsey (1931 ), de Finetti (1937 , Savage (1954) , and Anscombe and Aumann (1963) famously championed the Bayesian approach, suggesting that any uncertainty can be reduced to risk using the notion of subjective probabilities. The latter are defined behaviorally, as degrees of willingness to bet, embedded in a model of expected utility maximization.
Many statisticians were opposed to this line of reasoning, 1 and Ellsberg's 1 See Cifarelli and Regazzini (1996) , who describe Cantelli's reactions to de Finetti's ideas as "... speaking to Cantelli about subjective probability ... was tantamount to pulling a tiger by its tail." See also Knight (1921) and Keynes (1921) .
(1961) well-known experiments have shown that people often fail to behave in accordance with the Bayesian approach. In the 1980's two models were proposed, relaxing the axioms underlying subjective expected utility theory and generalizing it by allowing a representation of beliefs by a set of probabilities, rather than by a single probability. These approaches are often referred to as multiple prior models, and they tend to be closer to the classical statistics mindset, in which a set of distributions defines the inference problem, but no prior belief over the set can be assumed. One approach (Bewley, 2002 , see also Walley, 1981 uses the set of priors to define a partial order by unanimity: f is at least as desirable as g if and only if the expected utility of f is at least as high as that of g for each and every prior in the set. 2 The other (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) retains the completeness axiom, and derives a representation by the maxmin rule: f is preferred to g if and only if the minimal expected utility of f , over all possible priors in the set, is higher than the minimal expected utility of g.
We start with two binary relations, ³ % * ,%´, interpreted as objective and subjective rationality relation, as suggested above. Formally, we assume that the first satisfies the axioms of Bewley (2002) , 3 and the second -of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . This means that each relation can be represented by a set of priors: % * by unanimity, and% by the maxmin rule. However, the two sets of priors are unrelated. They may be different or even disjoint. We therefore introduce two additional axioms, explicitly relating the two relations, and show that these axioms hold if and only if the two sets of priors are indeed 2 Bewley's model dealt with a strict preference, represented by a strict inequality for each prior. Mathematically, it relied on Aumann (1962) . Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (1995) offer a model in which preferences are described by sets of probability-utility pairs. A derivation of Bewley's result in a purely subjective probability set-up is provided in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (GMMS, 2003) . 3 As explained below, our formulation differs from Bewley's on several minor points: it is closer to those of Shapley and Baucells (1998), GMMS (2003) , and Girotto and Holzer (2005) .
identical. Taken together, the axioms imply the existence of a set of priors that represents both % * and% simultaneously: the former via unanimity, and the latter -via the maxmin rule.
We describe the axioms and results in the next section. As a by-product, we offer a version of Bewley (2002) that deals with a general state space. This facilitates the comparison with the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) model, but may also be of interest in its own right. Section 3 is devoted to a discussion.
In particular, it argues that the present treatment highlights the extremity of the maxmin rule, and suggests alternative notions of subjective rationality.
Specifically, we also mention a variation in which the subjectively rational relation is Bayesian, that is, a model in which objective rationality is defined by unanimity with respect to a set of probabilities, but subjective rationality is defined by a Bayesian approach relative to a single probability in this set.
We conclude with general discussions of rationality and the related literature.
Model and Results

Preliminaries
We use a version of the Anscombe and Aumann (AA, 1963) model as re-stated by Fishburn (1970) .
Let X be a set of outcomes. The set of von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM, 1944) lotteries is
and it is endowed with a mixing operation: for every P, Q ∈ L and every
The set of states of the world is S endowed with an algebra Σ of events. The set ∆ (Σ) of (finitely additive) probabilities on Σ is endowed with the event-wise convergence topology. 4 The set of (simple) acts F consists of all simple measurable functions f : S → L. It is endowed with a mixture operation as well, performed pointwise. That is, for every f, g ∈ F and every α ∈ [0, 1],
The decision maker is characterized by two binary relations % * and% on F , denoting objective and subjective rational preferences, respectively. The relations Â * , ∼ * ,Â,∼ are defined as usual, namely, as the asymmetric and symmetric parts of % * and%, respectively.
We extend % * and% to L as usual. Thus, for P, Q ∈ L, P % Q means
for all s ∈ S and % is either % * or%. The set of all constant acts is denoted by F c .
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For a function u : X → R we will use the notation
for all P ∈ L. 6 Thus, if the decision maker chooses f ∈ F and Nature chooses s ∈ S, the decision maker gets a lottery f (s), which has the expected u-value
Several basic conditions
We now turn to discuss the axioms. It will be convenient to start with axioms and conditions that both relations are assumed to satisfy. As discussed in the introduction, completeness will not be among these conditions, as it is not a natural requirement when objective rationality is concerned.
5 We sometimes abuse the notation writing R instead of f R and L instead of F c . 6 One may replace L by any convex subset of a vector space, or even any mixture space, and E P u with the evaluation at P of an affine function u on L. All our results remain valid.
The following conditions are stated for a generic relation %. They will be imposed on both relations % * and%.
Basic Conditions:
Preorder: % is reflexive and transitive.
Monotonicity: For every f, g ∈ F , f (s) % g(s) for all s ∈ S implies f % g.
Archimedean Continuity: For all f, g, h ∈ F , the sets {λ
Non-triviality: There exist f, g ∈ F such that f Â g.
These axioms are standard, and their interpretation as conditions on objective, as well as on subjective rationality is straightforward. We only draw the reader's attention to reflexivity: as opposed to Bewley (2002) , we assume a reflexive relation. In the context of an incomplete relation, a representation of a reflexive relation % by (unanimity of) weak inequality is not equivalent to a representation of its asymmetric part Â by (unanimity of) strict inequality.
This necessitates a re-phrasing of Bewley's model, and a new representation result.
Axioms for objective and for subjective rationality
We now turn to discuss the axioms that are specific to objective or to subjective rationality.
Completeness: For every f, g ∈ F , f%g or g%f .
7 Since each of the following axioms will be assumed for one relation only, we state them directly in terms of this relation, rather than in terms of an abstract relation % as above.
In the sequel, we allow ourselves to use phrases such as "C-Completeness" and "% * satisfies C-Completeness" interchangeably.
As discussed above, subjective rationality is required to be complete, because eventually some decision will be taken. Objective rationality, by contrast, is not necessarily complete, because one may not have compelling reasons to determine preferences between certain pairs of alternatives. However, we do require that objective rationality be complete when restricted to the subset of constant acts. C-completeness verifies that the incompleteness of the objectively rational relation % * is not due to any difficulties that the decision maker might have about determining her preferences under certainty. That is,
we are not faced with a decision maker who can't decide whether she prefers chocolate to vanilla ice cream in terms of their immediate hedonic value. Any incompleteness of preferences will therefore be attributed to uncertainty about future outcomes of the options involved. (See Subsection 3.2 below.)
Independence
Independence: For every f, g, h ∈ F , and every α ∈ (0, 1),
C-Independence: For every f, g ∈ F , every h ∈ F c , and every α ∈ (0, 1),
We thus require that objective rationality satisfies the original AA independence axiom, whereas subjective rationality -only the weaker version referred to as C-Independence. As explained in the Introduction, the full force of the independence axiom may not be as compelling when applied to arbitrary preferences f%g, as when based on sound foundations represented by f % * g. By contrast, we assume that the decision maker would still find it embarrassing to violate C-Independence. The reason is that mixing f and g with a constant act h can be viewed as a change of scale on the expected utility axis, namely, adding a constant and multiplying by a positive constant. Since these manipulations do not alter the degree of uncertainty about the acts f and g, we find it reasonable for a decision maker to decide not to violate C-Independence even if she may violate Independence.
We will resort to an additional axiom:
The uncertainty aversion axiom has been introduced in Schmeidler (1986 Schmeidler ( , 1989 for the subjective preference%, and it says that the decision maker prefers "smoothing out" acts, replacing potential uncertainty about the states of the world by objective risk about the outcomes to be obtained in each and every state. Decision makers who do not accept it might be modeled by more general decision rules, as in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (GMM, 2004 ).
The Uncertainty Aversion axiom has no counterpart for objective rationality, because it is implied by the standard Independence axiom of AA, which is assumed to be satisfied by objective rationality.
To conclude, objective rationality, % * , satisfies versions of axioms that appeared in Aumann (1962) , Bewley (2002) , GMMS (2003), and Girotto and Holzer (2005) . Subjective rationality,%, satisfies the axioms of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) .
Representation of objective and of subjective rationality 2.4.1 Unanimity representation of objective rationality
The axioms we imposed on % * deliver a unanimity representation. Our first result extends Bewley (2002) to an infinite state space (see discussion in Section 3.3).
Theorem 1
The following are equivalent:
(i) % * satisfies the Basic Conditions, C-Completeness, and Independence;
(ii) there exist a non-empty closed and convex set C * of probabilities on Σ and a non-constant function u * : X → R such that, for every f, g ∈ F f % * g iff
Furthermore, in this case C * is unique and u * is cardinally unique.
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Remark 1 There is a natural trade-off between Archimedean Continuity and Independence. Theorem 1 holds unchanged if we replace Archimedean Continuity with the stronger:
(a) For all e, f, g, h ∈ F , the set {λ
and Independence with the weaker:
Maxmin representation of subjective rationality
The axioms we imposed on% deliver a maxmin rule.
Theorem 2 (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989 , Theorem 1) The following are equivalent:
(i)% satisfies the Basic Conditions, Completeness, C-Independence, and Uncertainty Aversion;
(ii) there exist a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on Σ and a non-constant function u : X → R such that, for every f, g ∈ F f%g iff min
Furthermore, in this case C is unique and u is cardinally unique.
8 We say that u * is cardinally unique if it is unique up to a positive linear transformation.
Relating objective and subjective rationality
We now come to discuss the relationship between the two orders.
Consistency
Consistency: f % * g implies f%g.
Consistency seems to be rather compelling given our interpretation of the two relations: if there are sound, objective reasons to weakly prefer f to g, we will not allow the decision maker to exhibit the preference gÂf . The choices of the decision maker cannot contradict evidence or logical reasoning. If an expert can prove that f is at least as good as g, given the decision maker's goals, the decision maker should obey this conclusion.
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This axiom can also be viewed as part of the definition of subjective rationality: intuitively, we argued that it is subjectively rational to prefer f to g if the decision maker cannot be convinced that she is wrong in exhibiting such a preference. One way in which the decision maker can be proven wrong is by pointing out internal inconsistencies to her. Indeed, the axioms imposed on% rule out such potential embarrassments. However, the decision maker can be proven wrong also directly, namely, if there are compelling, objective reasons to exhibit the opposite preference. Viewed thus, the consistency axiom complements the definition of subjective rationality, making sure that the decision maker will be proven wrong neither by internal inconsistency nor by external inconsistency.
Consistency can also be viewed as a reasoning template, or as an inference rule, provided the language allows preference propositions of both types (objective and subjective).
Observe that we do not require here the strict counterpart of the consistency axiom, namely that f Â * g would imply fÂg. Given the representation that we have in mind, this condition is somewhat less compelling: f Â * g means that it is established that f is as good as g, and that the converse is not 9 See Nehring (2000 Nehring ( ,2008 for similar reasoning.
established. But it does not mean that f was proven to be better than g -the possibility of equivalence cannot be ruled out. Hence, a thoughtful decision maker may admit that f Â * g but still hesitate to strictly prefer f to g.
Caution
Caution: For g ∈ F and f ∈ F c , g 6 % * f implies f%g.
This axiom implies that the decision maker in question is rather averse to ambiguity. Comparing a potentially uncertain act g and a constant (risky) act f , the decision maker first checks whether there are compelling reasons to prefer g to f . If there are, namely, g % * f , the axiom is vacuous (and g%f would follow from Consistency). If, however, no such reasons can be found, the decision maker would opt for the risky act over the uncertain one.
This ambiguity aversion content of the Caution axiom clearly emerges in Theorem 3, which shows that in our derivation Caution implies that% satisfies the Uncertainty Aversion axiom.
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Observe that the decision maker may find that there are compelling reasons to strictly prefer the risky act, that is, it may be the case that f Â * g. In this
case Caution would imply f%g, as would Consistency. However, the import of the Caution axiom is in completing preferences when pure reason cannot do the job. That is, if objective reasoning can neither suggest that f is preferred to g nor vice versa, then Caution can be invoked to settle the matter by opting for the sure thing.
This axiom is quite extreme in its aversion to uncertainty. See the discussion in Subsection 3.1.
Observe also that Caution differs from the other axioms in that it does not lend itself to a natural description in first order logic. Its antecedent, g 6 % * f , is interpreted as "there does not exist a proof that g is at least as good as f ".
10 In fact, in Theorem 3 the maxmin representation is derived without assuming the Uncertainty Aversion axiom. Since the representation implies the Uncertainty Aversion axiom, the latter is then implied by the other axioms in part (i) of Theorem 3. The only one among these axioms that relates to uncertainty aversion is indeed the Caution axiom.
Such a statement is beyond the scope of the simple preference propositions we were referring to in the discussion of the other axioms. However, the practical meaning of Caution is quite intuitive. We can imagine a process by which the consultant works with the decision maker and builds the relation % * as best they can. At some point, they find that they ran out of preferences that can be inferred from already existing ones and the AA axioms. At this point it is meaningful to compare any g to any risky f and complete the relation between them according to Caution.
Result
Theorem 3 The following are equivalent:
(i) % * satisfies the Basic Conditions, C-Completeness, and Independence, % satisfies the Basic Conditions, Completeness, C-Independence, and jointly ³ % * ,%´satisfy Consistency and Caution;
(ii) There exist a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on Σ and a non-constant function u : X → R such that, for every f, g ∈ F ,
and
Notice that we do not need to assume that% satisfies Uncertainty Aversion. In fact, its connection with % * through Caution already guarantees that % satisfies this property. In other words, Caution can be viewed as "fully" capturing uncertainty aversion in this dual setting.
For this reason, Theorem 3 can be also viewed as providing a novel foundation for the maxmin representation (2), based on the interplay of the two preferences % * and%.
Remark 2 Consider the following, stronger version of Caution:
(a) For g ∈ F and f ∈ F c , g 6 % * f implies fÂg.
Conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 3 are equivalent to the following:
(iii) % * satisfies the conditions (i) of Theorem 1,% satisfies Preorder, Archimedean
Continuity, and Completeness. Jointly, they satisfy Consistency and the above condition (a).
Discussion
Extremity of the maxmin rule
The Caution axiom is rather extreme. It says that, when an uncertain act is compared to a risky one, unless we know for sure that the former dominates the latter, we should prefer the latter. If, for example, we have no information whatsoever, so that the entire simplex ∆(S) is considered possible, we may set C = ∆(S). In this case the relation % * corresponds to weak dominance, and% -to the maxmin rule (without probabilities). Consider an act g such that E g(s) u = 1 for all s 6 = s 0 , and E g(s 0 ) u = −ε for some state s 0 and a small ε > 0. Let f be a constant act with expected utility of zero. Act g has a higher expected utility than does f for almost all priors in C = ∆(S). Still, for some priors the expected utility of g is below that of f , and Caution dictates that f be preferred to g.
This extreme nature of Caution is reflected in the extremity of the maxmin rule, when the set of probabilities C is interpreted as representing "hard evidence". Indeed, it has often been argued that evaluating an act f by its worst-case expected utility is unreasonable.
However, the set C in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is derived from preferences. It need not coincide with a set of probabilities that are externally given to the decision maker. The set C is defined in behavioral terms, as a representation of a binary relation%, and it need not coincide with any cognitive notion of a set of probabilities. Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (GHTV, 2007) study the maxmin model given different sets of objectively provided information, and axiomatize a maxmin rule with respect to a class of probabilities that is a subset of the probabilities provided to the decision maker. That is, their model allows the set of probabilities derived from observed behavior to be a strict subset of the set that is cognitively available.
By contrast, if we think of objective rationality as a cognitive concept, and, specifically, view % * as the preferences that are justified by all probabilities that are considered possible, then Caution does take a strict interpretation of the set of priors, identifying the set of measures used in the maxmin rule with the set of measures used to define objective rationality.
It follows that one may consider alternatives to the axiom of Caution. Simply dropping the axiom allows a representation of % * by one set of probabilities, C * , as in (3), and a representation of% by another set of probabilities, C, as in (4), where C ⊆ C * (see the proof of Theorem 3 in the appendix). One may formulate alternative axioms that will correspond to the way that the decision maker selects a subset of priors C as in GHTV (2007).
Another possible direction would be to impose different axioms on subjective rationality,%. For example, one may assume that this relation involves some aggregation of expected utilities based on second-order probabilities, as in Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) or Seo (2007) .
Yet another possibility is to assume that the decision maker's notion of internal consistency is structured enough to make% an Anscombe-Aumann relation. That is, subjectively rational decisions can be elaborate enough to allow subjective expected utility representation. One obvious way to do so would be for the decision maker to choose a prior out of the set C * , and to maximize expected utility with respect to this prior. In fact, any other way of complying with Anscombe-Aumann axioms and Consistency is observationally equivalent to such a selection of a prior.
We believe that Consistency is a fundamental axiom. In fact, it may be viewed as part of the definition of % * and%: if the former does not imply the latter, it is not clear that these relations can be thought of as objective and subjective rationality of the same decision maker. By contrast, the other axioms presented here should be viewed as examples. One may consider different axioms on % * and on%, and certainly also alternatives to the axiom of Caution.
Incompleteness of tastes and of beliefs
This paper deals with "incompleteness of beliefs", namely, with incompleteness of preferences that is due only to the absence of information, for which the decision maker does not know what the probabilities of various states of the world are. The completeness axiom has also been challenged under certainty, due to the fact that the decision maker simply may not have well-defined preferences.
This type of incompleteness, which may be dubbed "incompleteness of tastes", includes the models by Aumann (1962) , Kannai (1963) , and, more recently, Ok Incompleteness of tastes is explicitly excluded by our C-Completeness assumption. Observe that, in principle, one might reduce incompleteness of tastes to incompleteness of beliefs. In some cases, such a reduction is rather intuitive. For example, suppose that a decision maker is about the rent a car, and is offered a choice between two models at the same cost. One is smaller and easier to park, the other is more convenient for long trips. The decision maker may find the choice difficult to make, partly because she is unsure about her travel plans, the amount of time she will spend in the car due to traffic jams, and so forth. In this case it is natural to argue that the "certain" outcome of a car is, in fact, an uncertain act, providing different degrees of well-being at various states of the world.
In principle, such a reduction can always be performed, by introducing a "well-being" function whose maximization is tautologically the objective of the decision maker, and by modeling outcomes that cannot be ranked as acts whose outcomes are not known. But such a reduction is not always very intuitive. For example, suppose that a decision maker is at a restaurant she knows well, and she has to make a choice between a steak or a lobster. She is not concerned with long-term effects of this choice, nor does she have any meaningful uncertainty about the quality of the two dishes. She simply can't decide what she feels like having. In such a case, reduction of incompleteness of tastes to incompleteness of beliefs may not generate the most convenient or most intuitive model.
Our general approach, and, in particular, the two definitions of rationality, may apply to incompleteness of tastes as well. Indeed, the analysis above may benefit from generalizations to deal with incompleteness of preferences that derives both from incompleteness of beliefs and of tastes.
Related literature
GMM (2004) model a preference relation% which may exhibit non-neutrality to ambiguity, and they derive from it a relation that captures "unambiguous preferences". This relation, which they also denote by % * , is incomplete whenever% fails to satisfy the independence axiom. Moreover, when% is a maxmin expected utility relation, % * turns out to be a unanimity relation with respect to the same set of priors.
The present paper is very close to GMM (2004) in terms of the mathematical structure, and we have indeed relied on GMM's derivation of the unanimity rule (as opposed to the earlier work by Bewley, 2002) . However, the emphasis is slightly different. In our case, both% and % * are assumed as primitive relations, and the focus is on the relationships between them, as a step in the direction of modeling the reasoning process behind the completion of % * to a subjectively rational, but complete order%. If, for instance, one were to replace Caution by the axiom that% satisfies independence, the derived relation % * in GMM would equal%. By contrast, our model would still distinguish between subjective and objective rationality, and may be used to discuss the process by which a particular prior (corresponding to%) is selected out of the set of possible priors (corresponding to % * ).
Nehring (2000, 2008) also discusses the tension between the inability to have complete preferences that are rationally derived, and the need to make decisions. His model also deals with a pair of relations and the connection between them. In particular, he suggests that "contexts" can be used to choose a way of completing a relation, and has an axiom similar to our Consistency.
Formally, our unanimity representation result for % * , though independent, is very similar to Girotto and Holzer (2005) : the setup is slightly different and the proof is simpler. Rubinstein (1988) discusses preferences between simple lotteries, each guaranteeing a monetary prize x with a probability p, and 0 with probability (1−p).
He assumes two similarity relations, one on the interval of monetary prizes, and the other -on the interval of probabilities, and imposes a certain coherence between the preferences over lotteries and these similarity relations. Our approach is similar to Rubinstein's (1988) in that we assume more than one preference relation as primitive, in an attempt to gain some insight into the process by which preferences are generated. The two models deal, however, with different problems.
Another model that starts out with more than one relation is proposed by Mandler (2005) . He suggests to distinguish between "psychological preferences", which may be incomplete, and "revealed preferences", which are complete but may be intransitive. Our decision maker is closer to standard rationality assumptions in two ways: first, the incomplete preferences we assume are due to absence of information, or the inability to reject hypotheses. Second, the complete preferences in our model are supposed to be "subjectively" rational, and, in particular, transitive.
Danan (2006) also deals with two relations, cognitive and behavioral. Cognitive strict preference results in behavioral preference, but cognitive indifference might still be observed as a choice of a particular alternative, and thus appear as strict preference. In his language, our focus is on incompleteness of cognitive preferences. That is, we do not deal with the gap between the "true" preferences and their revelation in choice behavior, but with the problem of generating preferences in the first place.
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4 Appendix: Proofs and related material B 0 (Σ) is the vector space generated by the indicator functions of the elements of Σ, endowed with the supnorm. We denote by ba(Σ) the set of all bounded, finitely additive set functions on Σ, and by ∆(Σ) the set of all probabilities on Σ. As it is well known, ba(Σ), endowed with the total variation norm, is isometrically isomorphic to the norm dual of B 0 (Σ), in this case the weak* topology, w * , of ba(Σ) coincides with the event-wise convergence topology.
Given a non singleton interval K in the real line (whose interior is denoted
We recall that a binary relation & on B 0 (Σ, K) is:
• a preorder if it is reflexive and transitive;
• continuous if ϕ n & ψ n for all n ∈ N, ϕ n → ϕ and ψ n → ψ imply ϕ & ψ;
• Archimedean if the sets {λ ∈ [0, 1] : λϕ + (1 − λ)ψ & η} and {λ ∈ [0, 1] :
• affine if for all ϕ, ψ, η ∈ B 0 (Σ, K) and α ∈ (0, 1),
Proposition 1 (GMM, 2004, Proposition A.1) For i = 1, 2, let C i be nonempty subsets of ∆ (Σ) and & i be the relations defined on B 0 (Σ, K) by
and the following statements are equivalent:
Proposition 2 (GMM, 2004, Proposition A.2) & is a non-trivial, continuous, affine, and monotonic preorder on B 0 (Σ, K) if and only if there exists a non-empty subset C of ∆(Σ) such that
Moreover, co w * (C) is the unique weak* closed and convex subset of ∆(Σ) representing & in the sense of Eq. (5).
Lemmas
To prove our results we need some lemmas.
Proof. If & is affine and ϕ & ψ, then for all η ∈ B 0 (Σ) we have
While if γ ≥ 0 and per contra γϕ 6 & γψ, it cannot be γ = 0, 1. If γ ∈ (0, 1),
which is absurd since ϕ & ψ and & is affine. Else γ > 1, and γϕ 6 & γψ together with affinity delivers
which is absurd.
Conversely, it is obvious that ϕ, ψ, η ∈ B 0 (Σ), α ∈ (0, 1), and ϕ & ψ imply
On the other hand ϕ, ψ, η ∈ B 0 (Σ), α ∈ (0, 1), Proof. Suppose first 0 ∈ K • . We begin with a Claim:
Claim. Given any ϕ, ψ ∈ B 0 (Σ, K), the following facts are equivalent:
(ii) there exists α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ ∈ B 0 (Σ, K) and αϕ & αψ,
Proof of the Claim. (i)⇒(ii) and (iii)⇒(i) are obvious. We show (ii)⇒(iii).
By (ii), there exists α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ ∈ B 0 (Σ, K) and αϕ & αψ. If 0 ≤ β ≤ α, then by affinity
i.e., βϕ & βψ. Therefore, if (iii) does not hold, there exists β > α > 0 such that βϕ, βψ ∈ B 0 (Σ, K) and βϕ 6 & βψ. Then by affinity If ϕ, ψ, η ∈ B 0 (Σ) and λ ∈ (0, 1), take α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ, αη ∈
Thus & is affine.
Assume now that & is monotonic. If ϕ, ψ ∈ B 0 (Σ) are such that ϕ ≥ ψ, take α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ ∈ B 0 (Σ, K), then αϕ ≥ αψ and monotonicity of & delivers αϕ & αψ and ϕ & ψ. Thus & monotonic.
As to uniqueness, let & be an affine preorder on B 0 (Σ) that coincides with & on B 0 (Σ, K). For all ϕ, ψ ∈ B 0 (Σ), take α > 0 such that αϕ, αψ ∈ B 0 (Σ, K), 
It is easy to verify that & k is an affine preorder on 
Now, for all ϕ, ψ, η ∈ B 0 (Σ) take α > 0 and β ∈ R such that αϕ + β, αψ + If ϕ n & 0 for all n ∈ N and ϕ n → ϕ, let M = sup s∈S ϕ (s), which is indeed a maximum. For all ε ∈ (0, 1) there is n such that
11 Therefore, for all ε ∈ (0, 1) there is n ∈ N such that
Monotonicity of & delivers that, for all ε ∈ (0, 1),
But & is Archimedean, hence the set of all ε such that (6) holds is closed, and, containing (0, 1), it also contains 0, in particular ϕ & 0.
Conclude that, if ϕ n → ϕ, ψ n → ψ, and ϕ n & ψ n for all n ∈ N, then 
Moreover, co w * (C) is the unique weak* closed and convex subset of ∆(Σ) representing & in the sense of Eq. (7).
All the results we have proved so far hold more generally if B 0 (Σ) is replaced by any normed Riesz space with unit.
11 χ S is the constant function taking value 1 on S.
Proof of Theorem 1
Assume % * is a preorder satisfying Monotonicity, Archimedean Continuity, Non-triviality, C-Completeness, and Independence.
Archimedean Continuity, C-Completeness, and Independence, together with the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem (see the axiomatics of Herstein and Milnor, 1953) , imply that there exists a cardinally unique
Monotonicity and Non-triviality imply that u * is not constant. In what follows
s ∈ S, which by Monotonicity implies f ∼ * g.
By what we have just observed, & * is well defined on B 0 (Σ, U (L)) and it is characterized by
and a preorder.
Since there are f, g such that f Â * g (by Non-triviality of
Therefore & * is affine.
is closed in [0, 1] because of Archimedean Continuity of % * , and an analogous argument shows that {λ
for all s ∈ S, and by Monotonicity of
By Corollary 1, there exists a unique non-empty weak* closed and convex
The rest is trivial. 
Proof of Theorem 3
Assume that
• % * is a preorder satisfying Monotonicity, Archimedean Continuity, Nontriviality, C-Completeness, and Independence;
•% is a preorder satisfying Monotonicity, Archimedean Continuity, Nontriviality, Completeness, C-Independence;
• ³ % * ,%´satisfy Consistency.
By Theorem 1, there exist a non-empty closed and convex set C * of probabilities on Σ and a non-constant function u * : X → R such that, for every f, g ∈ F f % * g iff Z S E f (s) u * dp (s) ≥ Z S E g(s) u * dp (s) ∀p ∈ C * .
Set f % 0 g ∈ F iff λf + (1 − λ)h%λg + (1 − λ)h ∀λ ∈ [0, 1] , h ∈ F.
Lemma 1 and Propositions 5 and 7 of GMM (2004), guarantee that there exist a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on Σ, a non-constant function u : X → R, and a monotonic and constant linear functional I :
B 0 (Σ) → R such that, for every f, g ∈ F f%g iff I (E f u) ≥ I (E g u) ,
f % 0 g iff Z S E f (s) u dp (s) ≥ Z S E g(s) u dp (s) ∀p ∈ C,
min p∈C Z S E f (s) u dp (s) ≤ I (E f u) ,
moreover, equality holds in (11) for all f ∈ F if (and only if) % satisfies Uncertainty Aversion.
If Q, R ∈ L, then, by (8), Consistency, and (9),
Corollary B.3 of GMM (2004) delivers the existence of α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u * = αu + β. Wlog, u * = u.
Propositions 4 of GMM (2004) implies that % 0 is the maximal (relative to the inclusion in F × F ) relation on F satisfying Independence and contained in%. Consistency guarantees that % * is contained in%, and % * satisfies Independence, thus
, (10), and Proposition 1 deliver C ⊆ C * .
Assume that also Caution holds. If there is g ∈ F such that I (E g u) > min p∈C * Z S E g(s) u dp (s) , then, there is Q ∈ L such that I (E g u) > E Q u > min p∈C * Z S E g(s) u dp (s)
that is, g 6 % * Q and gÂQ, which violates Caution. Thus, by (11) and C ⊆ C * , min p∈C Z S E f (s) u dp (s) ≤ I (E f u) ≤ min p∈C * Z S E f (s) u dp (s) ≤ min p∈C Z S E g(s) u dp (s) ∀f ∈ F and Proposition 1 delivers C * ⊆ C.
12
The rest is trivial.
Alternative Axioms: Next we call Default to Certainty the strong caution requirement (a) of Remark 2.
Assume that 12 Since, as f ranges in F , E f (·) u ranges in B 0 (Σ, K), where K is the non-trivial interval {E Q u : Q ∈ L}.
•% is a preorder satisfying Archimedean Continuity and Completeness;
• ³ % * ,%´satisfy Consistency and Default to Certainty.
By Theorem 1, there exists a non-empty closed and convex set C of probabilities on Σ and a non-constant function u : X → R such that, for every f, g ∈ F f % * g iff Z S E f (s) u dp (s) ≥ Z S E g(s) u dp (s) ∀p ∈ C.
Let P, Q ∈ L. By Consistency P % * Q implies P%Q.
By Default to Certainty
P Â * Q implies PÂQ.
Therefore% and % * coincide on L, and P 7 → E P u represents both preorders on L.
In particular,% satisfies Monotonicity, in fact, f (s)%g (s) for all s ∈ S
implies, by what we have just shown, f (s) % * g (s) for all s ∈ S, which, by Monotonicity of % * implies f % * g, and Consistency delivers f%g.
For all f ∈ F , let P, Q ∈ L be such that P%f (s)%Q for all s ∈ S, then such that βP + (1 − β)Q∼f . In particular, for each act f there exists R f ∈ L such that R f∼ f .
There are two possibilities
• f %
